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data and after the data have been shared. The data remain 
entirely under the direct management of the study that col-
lected them. Data processing commands are strictly super-
vised, and the data are queried in a protected environment. 
Issues related to the return of individual research results 
when data are shared are eliminated; the responsibility for 
return remains at the study of origin.  Conclusion: DataSHIELD 
can provide an innovative and robust solution for address-
ing commonly encountered ethics-related data-sharing 
concerns.  © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Vast amounts of data are needed to study the causes of 
disease and elucidate interactions between genes and en-
vironment  [1] . Building enriched datasets typically in-
volves integrating data from diverse sources, including 
clinical care, health registries and research data, and often 
includes transnational data sharing  [2] . Such data sharing 
is increasingly demanded by research funders as a way to 
accelerate scientific discovery and maximise the econom-
ic returns on research data  [3–5] . Much of the data shar-
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 Abstract 
 Background: DataSHIELD (Data Aggregation Through 
Anonymous Summary-statistics from Harmonised Individu-
al levEL Databases) has been proposed to facilitate the co-
analysis of individual-level data from multiple studies with-
out physically sharing the data. In a previous paper, we in-
vestigated whether DataSHIELD could protect participant 
confidentiality in accordance with UK law. In this follow-up 
paper, we investigate whether DataSHIELD addresses a 
broader range of ethics-related data-sharing concerns. 
 Methods: Ethics-related data-sharing concerns of Institu-
tional Review Boards, ethics experts, international research 
consortia and research participants were identified through 
a literature search and systematically examined at a multi-
disciplinary workshop to determine whether DataSHIELD 
proposes mechanisms which can address these concerns. 
 Results: DataSHIELD addresses several ethics-related data-
sharing concerns related to privacy, confidentiality, and the 
protection of the research participant’s rights while sharing 
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ing that has taken place in the international consortia 
studying genetics and disease has occurred at the aggre-
gate or summary level for the conduct of meta-analyses 
 [6] . Sharing summary-level data offers more data secu-
rity than sharing individual-level data, but does not offer 
the analytical flexibility and precision that can be achieved 
when sharing individual-level data. For instance, sum-
mary statistics often fail to convey all of the information 
held in the individual-level raw data or may not suffice to 
extend exploration of significant findings. In compari-
son, sharing individual-level data from local study sites 
offers much greater analytical flexibility, and sometimes 
increased precision because the individual-level data can 
be pooled and analysed directly. However, it is ethically 
more challenging because individual-level data may con-
tain sensitive information about the individual’s health, 
lifestyle, genotype, or sociodemographic factors that po-
tentially can be used to identify these individuals or pro-
vide extensive insight into their private life. Accordingly, 
mechanisms are typically put in place when sharing data 
to safeguard against re-identification, prevent potential 
data misuses and protect privacy and confidentiality. 
Such mechanisms include both technical (e.g. data cod-
ing, password-protected access, use of off-site broker 
with key, limitations on publishable sample size) and ad-
ministrative (e.g. data access agreements, confidentiality 
clauses) solutions  [7] . However, they often place severe 
limitations on data sharing, can require considerable ad-
ministrative effort and do not always sufficiently address 
concerns surrounding data sharing. For instance, even if 
data access agreements are established for a data-sharing 
collaboration, it can prove difficult to control what hap-
pens with the data once they are transferred to another 
site  [8–9] .
 With these considerations in mind, an international 
team of researchers developed DataSHIELD (Data Ag-
gregation Through Anonymous Summary-statistics from 
Harmonised Individual levEL Databases)  [10] . The ob-
jective of DataSHIELD is to facilitate the co-analysis of 
data with all the benefits of individual-level analysis while 
recognising and finding alternatives that address the ma-
jor ethical concerns that usually accompany individual-
level data sharing. DataSHIELD is being developed by the 
Data to Knowledge (D2K) Research Group at the Univer-
sity of Bristol under the umbrella of the FP7 collaborative 
project BioSHaRE (Biobank Standardisation and Har-
monisation for Research Excellence in the European 
Union)  [11] .
 In a previous paper, we investigated whether 
DataSHIELD could appropriately protect participant 
confidentiality according to UK legal standards  [12] . That 
paper concludes that DataSHIELD reaches UK standards 
of protection for the sharing of biomedical data and calls 
for further investigation of DataSHIELD to determine if 
it satisfies other legal and ethics review requirements, also 
outside of the UK. In this follow-up paper, we investigate 
whether DataSHIELD addresses a broader range of eth-
ics-related data-sharing concerns. Our analysis focuses 
on the main data-sharing concerns encountered and 
raised by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), ethics ex-
perts, international research consortia, and research par-
ticipants across multiple countries.
 What Is DataSHIELD? 
 DataSHIELD is an analytical tool that enables the co-
analysis of individual-level data from multiple studies or 
sources without physically transferring or sharing the 
data and without providing any direct access to individ-
ual-level data  [13–15] . DataSHIELD can be used to run 
the same kind of analyses as with any other statistical tool. 
For instance, DataSHIELD can be used to produce a table 
showing the age distribution of patients in several studies 
in percentages or to analyse variables providing informa-
tion about age (X 1 ) and smoking habit (X 2 ) with the ob-
jective to predict a risk of cancer outcome (Y). The range 
of possible analyses in DataSHIELD is outlined in the 
DataSHIELD wiki  [16] .
 Figure 1 illustrates how the traditional analytical work-
flow is reversed under DataSHIELD. Rather than bring-
ing the data to the analyses, the analyses are brought to 
the data. Individual-level data are never transferred away 
from the local study computers; parallel data analyses 
commands are instead simultaneously brought to bear on 
the individual-level data at each local site involved in the 
collaboration. Through iterative computational process-
ing, the only information that is transferred back and 
forth between the local sites holding their data and the 
analysis centre are the analytical commands and the re-
sultant nonidentifying statistical estimates and summary 
parameters generated from those commands.
 As described in  figure 2 , DataSHIELD is primarily 
used for co-analysis of data when each data source con-
tains the same variables (e.g. age, sex, blood pressure) on 
different individuals (this is called horizontal partition-
ing)  [17] . DataSHIELD is also being developed for co-
analysis of data when different data sources (e.g. a cohort 
study, a hospital record, a registry) report different vari-
ables on the same individuals (this is called vertical parti-
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tioning). This paper focuses solely on horizontal parti-
tioning which has recently been implemented as an open-
source software application and is therefore likely to be 
encountered by ethics committees, IRBs and other gover-
nance boards.
 What Is Needed to Use DataSHIELD? 
 The use of DataSHIELD requires the establishment of 
a specific IT environment which includes a central analy-
sis computer, OPAL database servers  [18] , the open-
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 Fig. 1. DataSHIELD analytical flow. 
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 Fig. 2. Horizontal versus vertical partition-
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held in 6 data files, one for each study.
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source software for statistical computing R  [19] , and the 
DataSHIELD R packages  [10] . Both Opal software and 
DataSHIELD R packages are open source and freely avail-
able to the research community. The Opal servers are in-
stalled inside the firewall at the local study sites of all the 
collaborating studies. Other requirements for co-analysis 
of data under DataSHIELD do not differ from conven-
tional approaches with respect to preparatory activities 
and include checking that governance stipulations allow 
the data to be used for the specified project, identifying 
the variables to use from the different studies, harmonis-
ing the measures to be analysed and de-identifying the 
data to be shared from each of the local datasets.
 Method 
 In August 2012, we organised a multidisciplinary workshop 
gathering biostatisticians, epidemiologists, sociologists, lawyers, 
and ethicists, all involved in the development of DataSHIELD and 
members of the BioSHaRE project  [11] . Before the workshop, a 
literature search was conducted in Pubmed, Google Scholar and 
the internet using the combination of the search terms ‘data shar-
ing’ and ‘ethics’ and/or ‘concerns’ and/or ‘experiences’ to identify 
common ethics-related data-sharing concerns of IRBs, ethics ex-
perts, international research consortia, and research participants. 
Based on the results from the literature search, a list of commonly 
encountered ethics-related data-sharing concerns was set up and 
distributed at the workshop. The workshop members conducted
a systematic examination of this list in order to discuss how 
DataSHIELD may or may not address each of the concerns identi-
fied. The objective was to determine whether each concern (i) 
could be solved or ameliorated by DataSHIELD; (ii) could be cre-
ated or made worse by DataSHIELD; (iii) was independent of 
DataSHIELD, and so could not be ameliorated by DataSHIELD, 
but equally was no more of a problem for DataSHIELD than for 
any other form of data sharing or co-analysis. The discussions at 
the workshop also encompassed a range of technical statistics/IT 
considerations, and legal, professional, and societal issues (e.g. re-
lated to the appropriate identification of intellectual property and 
contribution), but this paper focuses solely on key issues from the 
perspective of ethical and governance boards.
 Results 
 Main Ethics-Related Data-Sharing Concerns 
 Our literature search revealed that ethics-related data-
sharing concerns are primarily related to (1) the protec-
tion of the privacy and confidentiality of the data, (2) the 
protection of the research participants’ rights when data 
are shared, and (3) what may happen to the data after they 
have been shared. These concerns are described below 
and summarised in  table 1 .
 Concerns Related to the Protection of the Privacy 
and Confidentiality of the Data 
 A major concern of IRB members  [20–22] , ethics ex-
perts  [9, 23–28] , members of international research con-
sortia  [29–31] , and research participants  [32–36] is that 
the privacy and confidentiality of the data may be breached 
when the data are shared, potentially leading to making 
the participants’ specific health risks public. For instance, 
datasets may accidentally disclose sensitive information, 
even when they have been modified to include only non-
identifiable information because external investigators 
are able to link the information in the dataset with infor-
mation in other publicly available datasets to re-identify 
individuals  [37–39] or because summary data may unex-
pectedly be found to convey more information that had 
previously been believed  [40–41] . Similarly, a researcher 
may deliberately violate the terms of the informed consent 
and share sensitive data that should not be shared with 
other investigators outside of the study of origin  [42] . The 
security of the data can also be jeopardised if the individ-
ual-level datasets are hacked or copied when physically 
transferred to a central computing unit for analysis  [43] .
 Concerns Related to the Protection of the Research 
Participants’ Rights 
 Several concerns arise in data-sharing collaborations 
regarding the protection of the research participants’ 
rights. First, it is often difficult for researchers to know 
whether data sharing is compatible with the terms of the 
original consent  [29–31, 44] . This is primarily because 
many consent forms, particularly those collected some 
decades ago, do not explicitly mention data sharing at all 
 [45] . Second, it is often difficult for researchers to ensure 
that the research participants’ right to withdraw from a 
study at ‘any time and without any conditions’ (as usu-
ally formulated in consents) and the right to require that 
personal data be deleted and removed from the research 
databases are sufficiently protected when the data are 
shared multiple times across studies and managed by oth-
ers  [44] . To address this issue, recent versions of informed 
consent are often modified to explain that data cannot be 
withdrawn and deleted once they have been physically 
distributed for analysis  [46] . This approach may seem to 
solve the issue of withdrawal, but in practice, it restricts 
the individual’s right to withdraw as this right then only 
applies if the data are not shared. Third, it is often difficult 
for researchers to know how to handle the feedback of 
individual research results produced through data shar-
ing to research participants. Although the issue of wheth-
er individual research results, in particular from genetic 
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and genomic research, should be returned to research 
participants is still much debated, several contemporary 
opinions and guidelines favour return of certain results 
under specific circumstances  [47–51] . Providing such re-
sults may not be problematic when the data are processed 
at the site of the study of origin, but this can become much 
more complicated when the data are shared. Namely, 
which investigator is responsible for returning individual 
research results to participants: the researcher of the orig-
inal study or the researcher who actually generated the 
relevant results having gained access to the data at a later 
point in time  [51] ?
 Post-Data-Sharing Concerns 
 Protecting the data and the research participants’ 
rights after the data have been shared is another key con-
cern. For instance, who is responsible for ensuring that 
data are appropriately stored and curated in the future, 
and who ensures that they are accessed only by those who 
have proper authorisation, if secondary access is award-
ed to a research group that is then wound up, for exam-
ple, because its leader retires  [52] ? Although codes of 
conduct have recently been proposed to help pave the 
way for a common set of data-sharing principles  [53, 54] 
and recommendations have been forwarded for the es-
tablishment of international governance models when 
sharing data  [55] , there is currently no standard protocol 
to help guide the allocation of complementary gover-
nance responsibilities to different research groups (e.g. 
the original data generators and secondary users) or to 
indicate precisely what these responsibilities may entail 
 [44, 56] .
Table 1.  Common ethics-related data-sharing concerns and how they are addressed by DataSHIELD
Data-sharing concerns How concerns are addressed
usually in DataSHIELD
Protection of the privacy and confidentiality of the data
Breaches of privacy and confidentiality of the 
data
• Technical mechanisms (e.g. data coding, 
password-protected access, use of off-site 
broker with key, limitations on publishable 
sample size)
•
In addition to standard technical and administrative 
mechanisms
Individual-level data are never physically shared with 
researchers outside of the study of origin
• Administrative mechanisms (e.g. data access 
agreements, confidentiality clauses)
• 3-level testing of commands for risks of disclosure
• Output restrictions to impede return of possibly 
identifiable results
• New subject’s identifiers are automatically generated by 
Opal; original subject’s identifiers assigned by studies 
are never exposed and are stored securely in a distinct 
database in Opal
Risk of residual or inferential disclosure • Standard statistical disclosure methodologies •  Standard statistical disclosure methodologies
• Any dis closure can be easily identified, investigated and 
managed
Risk of hacking in via a portal to the internet • No standard solution. If the absolute security 
of a given data set is of utmost importance, 
then best practice is for it to be inaccessible 
from the internet
• Moving the data for the DataSHIELD analysis to a 
separate database behind the study’s firewall and using 
DataSHIELD via an Opal server
Protection of the research participants’ rights
Data sharing according to the terms of the 
original consent
• Necessary ethico-legal and data access 
approvals required
• Necessary ethico-legal and data access approvals 
required
Complexity of guaranteeing the right to 
withdraw data from shared datasets
• Clause in informed consent that the data 
cannot be withdrawn once they are shared
• Individual-level data are never shared and can therefore 
be withdrawn/deleted locally
Complexity of returning individual results to 
research participants
• Variety of policies: from no return of results 
to some return of validated clinically useful 
results
• Individual research results are never produced, so no 
results to return; the exploration, identification and 
return of potentially relevant individual-level results 
remain sole responsibility of the local study that 
originally collected the data
Post-data-sharing concerns
Complexity of protecting the data and the 
research participants’ rights once the data 
have been shared
• No standard solution • Individual-level data are never physically shared. All 
aspects of the ongoing management of data and 
research participants’ rights in relation to those data 
remain with the local study
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 Properly addressing the ethics-related data-sharing 
concerns described above is often burdensome and dif-
ficult for researchers who have certainly not sought these 
formal responsibilities. For instance, the more the data 
are shared, the more difficult it becomes for the investiga-
tor of the original study or the biobank which collected 
the data to monitor and control how the data are handled 
by others and to properly assess potential risks related to 
the sharing of those data. This is primarily because the 
level of risk is a function of the full data environment – the 
datasets and the available technologies – and not just of 
the dataset alone  [9] . Furthermore, having full control re-
garding the fate of the data over time requires resources 
that are often nonexistent or scarce  [52] . For instance, 
research collaborations are normally set up for a limited 
period of time. What happens to the data after the col-
laboration has ended and how they are to be protected 
from potential misuses is rarely made explicit and is often 
unclear  [52] .
 How Does the DataSHIELD Approach Address
Ethics-Related Data-Sharing Concerns? 
 DataSHIELD has a number of characteristics that pro-
vide solutions to several of the ethics-related data-sharing 
concerns described above. Primarily 4 sets of mecha-
nisms apply in DataSHIELD to protect the privacy and 
confidentiality of the data. First, the individual-level data 
are never physically shared or transferred, but are instead 
queried locally. This has positive implications for many 
of the concerns normally encountered when sharing data 
as summarised in  table 1 . For instance, concerns regard-
ing the protection of the research participants’ right to 
withdraw data from shared datasets become nonexistent 
as the data never leave the local study sites and can easily 
be removed or destroyed locally. This also allows the local 
sites to ensure that the research use complies with existing 
consents. Similarly, returning individual research results 
to research participants is a nonissue under DataSHIELD 
because co-analysis in DataSHIELD never produces ex-
plicit individual-level research results. Although the con-
tribution of the data from each individual is properly
included in every analysis, that contribution is always 
merged with the equivalent contributions of all of the oth-
er participants of that same study before the information 
driving the overall analysis is transmitted from the study 
to the analysis centre. This means that individual results 
are invisible to the statistician coordinating the central 
analysis and cannot even be inferred by anybody outside 
the original study itself. One may ask whether designing 
a system that prevents the return of individual research 
results to participants is acceptable at a time when such 
return is increasingly recommended by commentators 
 [47–51] . However, the decision to use DataSHIELD im-
plies that the return of results has been properly discussed 
prior to analysis and that the research participants en-
dorse the return policy that applies for them.
 Second, each DataSHIELD command systematically 
goes through a 3-level validation process to ensure that it 
does what it has been designed for and that potential dis-
closure risks are kept to a minimum. Each command is 
internally checked and tested by a DataSHIELD devel-
oper other than the one who wrote the command, then 
checked again by an external ‘expert’ not involved in the 
development of DataSHIELD, and finally, reviewed by 
the DataSHIELD Advisory Board which discusses wheth-
er the command respects the privacy- and confidentiali-
ty-protecting principles of the DataSHIELD platform. 
The advisory board may request that some changes are 
made to the command and takes the final decision of ap-
proving or rejecting the command. Commands or se-
quences of commands that are explicitly disclosive are 
systematically blocked. In addition, special restrictions 
may be placed on the nature of the output that a particu-
lar DataSHIELD command can return. For example, con-
tingency table analyses can only produce tables which 
contain no cells with counts between 1 and 4, and where 
necessary, these limits can be tailored to reflect specific 
legislation in the country of origin of the study. Similarly, 
when graphical representations are used to display the 
relationship between 2 variables, heat map plots and con-
tour plots are used rather than standard point-by-point 
representations. This is because some points may be dis-
closive for certain individuals. If disclosure was to occur, 
the commands that are responsible for the disclosure can 
be easily identified as all commands that are issued are 
recorded, and it is kept track of who actually issued them. 
Any accidental disclosure can therefore lead to a suitable 
warning, and appropriate sanctions can be applied if de-
liberate maleficence has occurred.
 Third, DataSHIELD includes a number of mecha-
nisms to protect the data from any potential external at-
tack. As described earlier, the use of DataSHIELD in-
volves an internet communication between the central 
analysis computer and the study’s Opal servers. Using the 
internet to exchange data always involves some level of 
risk, and it is impossible to guarantee that no one will, at 
some point in time, attempt to compromise the security 
of the data.
 To minimise risks, DataSHIELD follows best practice 
by ensuring that the operating system and software are 
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secure and kept up-to-date to address new and emerging 
threats  [57–58] . In addition, all communication across 
the internet between the study computers and the analy-
sis centre is encrypted and secured. For instance, web ser-
vices are accessed through Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
Secure and Opal systematically checks the digital signa-
tures of any user  [59] . IP address filtering can be config-
ured in the study’s firewalls to prevent any other com-
puter than the allowed central analysis one to connect to 
the Opal servers. Even if someone was to hack in and de-
crypt the data traffic flowing back and forth between the 
analysis centre and the local studies, that traffic is delib-
erately nondisclosive – this being the fundamental basis 
of DataSHIELD  [14] .
 In some cases, although the main database of a given 
study may be too sensitive to allow any risk of access via 
the internet, the subset of data required for a particular 
analysis under DataSHIELD may not demand such strin-
gent isolation. In such cases, it is possible to place the data 
to be used in the analysis in a separate database still lo-
cated behind the firewall of the study. It should, however, 
be noted that in cases where the absolute security of the 
data is of utmost importance, then the best practice for 
data of this kind is for it to be inaccessible from the inter-
net, in which case DataSHIELD is not an appropriate tool 
to use.
 Finally, DataSHIELD is an open-source tool. It can be 
examined and audited by any potential user who can con-
tribute to its future improvement, which means that no 
one has to take on trust claims that its operations are se-
cure: users can check for themselves.
 Discussion 
 The main ethics-related data-sharing concerns relate 
both to the protection of the privacy and confidentiality 
of the data and the protection of the research participants’ 
rights while the data are being shared and after the data 
sharing has taken place. These results are corroborated by 
findings from a video ethnography (observation) study of 
an early DataSHIELD development workshop  [15] . In 
this study, the centrality of concerns about the mainte-
nance of privacy and confidentiality for individual-level 
data by DataSHIELD developers and would-be users was 
demonstrated.
 Our analysis reveals that many of the most common 
ethics-related data-sharing concerns become nonissues 
or are greatly alleviated under DataSHIELD. Concerns 
related to the protection of the research participants’ 
rights are eliminated because the data are never physi-
cally shared and, therefore, remain entirely under the di-
rect management of the study that collected them. Con-
cern related to the protection of the privacy and confiden-
tiality of the data is minimised as the data are never 
physically accessed by others, and key security features 
are built into DataSHIELD to reduce disclosure risks. 
This may significantly change the way cross-study analy-
ses are conducted in research collaborations and facilitate 
the conduct of a variety of research projects. For instance, 
research consortia increasingly need to share their data 
not only intraconsortium, but also with other consortia 
and the scientific community at large  [52] . However, this 
is often difficult due to the sensitive nature of the data. 
Similarly, researchers often need to pool data from di-
verse sources, for instance medical records and other ad-
ministrative databases. However, such pooling may jeop-
ardise patient confidentiality  [60] . By using DataSHIELD, 
risks of privacy and confidentiality breaches would be re-
duced to an ‘absolute and acceptable minimum’, although 
not entirely eradicated  [60] .
 DataSHIELD may also facilitate the sharing of data 
that otherwise would not be shared due to intellectual 
property concerns as it allows sharing information held 
in the data without having to physically transfer or share 
the data themselves  [60] . Finally, DataSHIELD may fa-
cilitate the conduct of research projects which normally 
are too difficult to realise due to technical constraints. For 
instance, while data sharing often requires a lot of com-
putational capacity when large data files are transferred 
to a central computer for analysis, such capacity is not 
needed in DataSHIELD, since the data files remain on lo-
cal study sites; it is only the nondisclosive summary sta-
tistics that are passed between studies and the analysis 
centre, and these are generally very small. The use of 
DataSHIELD may also improve the quality of co-analysis. 
Study sites participating in a standard collaboration, for 
instance conventional meta-analysis, are normally re-
quired to run statistical analysis of similar quality and de-
sign. This can be difficult to coordinate and police when 
datasets from numerous sites are used. In DataSHIELD, 
the same data analysis commands are sent to all local 
study computers simultaneously. Variations in com-
mand quality or design are therefore never encountered.
 As explained earlier, DataSHIELD cannot be used in 
research projects which require producing disclosive 
summaries (such as point-by-point representations in 
scatter plots) as such features are blocked in DataSHIELD 
to protect the confidentiality of the data  [60] . However, 
alternative solutions can be provided, for instance, graph-
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ical representations such as contour plots which do not 
include individual data points  [60] .
 A central question is whether analysis in DataSHIELD 
still qualifies as data sharing per se, since the individual-
level data are never physically shared but queried at local 
study sites and only summary statistics are shared. In our 
previous paper led by Susan Wallace  [12] , we suggested 
that the summary statistics processed in DataSHIELD are 
anonymous data which could potentially be shared with-
out referral to European data protection principles, thus 
opening for pan-European use of the data. A similar anal-
ysis could indicate whether DataSHIELD can cross inter-
nal national borders (i.e. US state or Canadian provincial 
borders) or international borders. Current practice is that 
researchers normally do not share individual-level data if 
the consent of the study of origin does not allow sharing 
or does not specifically mention the possibility of data 
sharing. Such practice is legitimate but limits the possi-
bilities of retrospective research when the consents do not 
mention data sharing. It can reasonably be argued that 
the analytical process in DataSHIELD should be consid-
ered to be equivalent to meta-level analysis using summa-
ry-level data (which is normally the standard data-shar-
ing practice when the informed consent does not men-
tion or authorise data sharing). However, technological 
approaches should not be used as a way of circumventing 
informed consent. Therefore, further research is needed 
to determine whether IRBs and research participants 
would be comfortable with the use of DataSHIELD in the 
absence of explicit consent but with the approval of ethics 
and scientific review bodies.
 As an entirely new approach to the joint analysis of 
data from several studies, DataSHIELD offers some po-
tentially exciting opportunities. We encourage members 
of IRBs and ethics committees to consider and discuss 
whether the use of DataSHIELD is consistent with the 
original intents for use of data as framed in the informed 
consents of the studies they manage. Similarly, we en-
courage researchers to consider whether the use of 
DataSHIELD may be useful in their research collabora-
tions. Feedback from the community on this matter is 
greatly appreciated.
 Conclusion 
 Multiple-site individual-level data analysis is increas-
ingly needed to accelerate research discovery but encoun-
ters a number of ethical challenges. DataSHIELD offers a 
new approach to data sharing and is currently being test-
ed in real-life epidemiological projects, including the 
Healthy Obese Project of the BioSHaRE project  [11] . In 
our previous paper led by Susan Wallace  [12] , we con-
cluded that DataSHIELD was in compliance with UK 
standards of protection for the sharing of biomedical 
data. Here, we demonstrate that DataSHIELD can also 
address a number of commonly encountered ethics-relat-
ed data-sharing concerns. New commands are being de-
veloped in DataSHIELD to address the needs of a variety 
of collaborations. Further work is needed to investigate 
whether the use of DataSHIELD is compliant with legal 
requirements in countries other than the UK.
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